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1 By monetary policy “debate,”
we are referring to a broad pub-
lic forum that includes business
economists and academics, in
addition to Federal Reserve pol-
icymakers. 
 












n the minutes of its December 17, 1996
meeting,  the Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC) described its policy
stance as one of  “watchful waiting.”  In
the second half of that year, especially, the
FOMC stood poised to counter the emer-
gence of any inﬂationary imbalances that
would threaten the ongoing economic
expansion.  No policy tightening was actu-
ally implemented in 1996, so the only
action was a slight policy ease on January
31 in response to concerns about a slowing
economy.  In this article, we analyze the
FOMC’s 1996 policy stance and argue that
the Committee’s immediate objective was
to maximize the horizon for which a
healthy economic expansion would be
expected to continue.  For its part, the
FOMC has indicated that the prevention of
any upward creep in inﬂation is vital to the
continued health of the expansion, but
that near-term decreases in the trend rate
of inﬂation are not. Support for this inter-
pretation is found in published summaries
of the 1996 FOMC meetings and public
statements by Committee members.
We also describe widely-discussed
pieces of research that ﬁgured in the 1996
monetary policy debate.1 On balance, we
conclude that the most inﬂuential academic
research lent the FOMC caution in consid-
ering the immediate implementation of
actions aimed at realizing its long-run goal
of price stability.   Moreover, even if  FOMC
members are skeptical of the validity of a
given study’s policy implications, they must
consider that study’s impact on opinion in
broader policy circles.  We begin this
article with a positive description of the
FOMC’s actions in 1996 vis-a-vis two esti-
mates of the policy-implied inﬂation rate.
We then discuss the implications of several
pieces of recent academic research and their
impact on the monetary policy debate.
IMPLICIT INFLATION
TARGETS: AN EMPIRICAL
SUMMARY OF FOMC POLICY
FOMC policy actions are often summa-
rized by the Committee’s adjustments to the
federal funds rate—the interest rate paid on
interbank loans.  Although the Federal
Reserve has no formal inﬂation target, two
instrument rules for the federal funds rate—
the Taylor (1993) rule and the Dueker and
Fischer (1996) inﬂation-targeting model—
allow one to infer inﬂation objectives that
are embedded in past and present policy
actions. Used this way, these instrument
rules help to elucidate the FOMC’s implied
inﬂation tolerances during the period of
watchful waiting in 1996.
The Taylor (1993) rule speciﬁes a
long-run inﬂation objective, but no date by
which the objective should be attained,
because the rule is designed to allow mon-
etary policy to respond to both inﬂation
and output gaps. Monetary policy attempts
to reduce inﬂation or close a positive gap
between actual and potential output by
raising the real fed funds rate, relative to
the equilibrium real rate (assumed by
Taylor to be 2 percent); conversely, it
lowers the real fed funds rate to raise inﬂa-
tion or stimulate real output.  In symbols,
the Taylor rule sets the funds rate
according to this formula:
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2 Taylor’s (1993) formula has
coefﬁcients of one-half on the
inﬂation and output gaps and
thus implies smaller differences
in policy in the short run for alter-
native long-run inﬂation targets.
3 The potential output series used






R is the fed funds rate, p is
inflation, p* is the long-run target rate of
inflation, y is the logarithm of GDP, and yp
is the logarithm of potential GDP, which is
estimated separately.2
Figure 1 plots the federal funds rate
together with the implied rate from Taylor’s
rule for long-run inﬂation targets of 2.0 per-
cent, 3.0 percent, and 4.0 percent.3 It  shows
that FOMC rate settings in 1992-1993
deviated sharply from the Taylor rule.  The
federal funds rate in this period dipped
below the level implied by even the 4 per-
cent long-run inﬂation target.  Increases in
the funds rate in 1994 and early 1995,
however, brought policy into line with a
Taylor rule setting with a 2 percent
inﬂation target.  To maintain consistency
with the 2 percent target, the funds rate
would have needed to increase by about
100 basis points from mid-1995 to the end
of 1996, whereas it actually declined by
about 75 basis points.  At the end of 1996,
the funds rate was consistent with a
Taylor-rule inﬂation target of slightly less
than 3 percent.
A complementary view of FOMC policy
settings comes from the inﬂation-targeting
model of Dueker and Fischer (1996), in
which policy is aimed at a one-year-ahead
inﬂation target with no feedback from
output gaps.  In contrast to the Taylor rule,
our model sets a speciﬁc timetable for
meeting the inﬂation target by focusing on
this single objective.  Another difference is
that our model does not impose any
assumptions concerning the long-run level
of the equilibrium real funds rate, because
the monetary authority need not impose
prior beliefs about this variable in order to
target inﬂation period by period.  The
inﬂation-targeting rule relates changes in
the funds rate to the targeted rate of inﬂa-
tion.4 Figure 2 plots the changes in the
funds rate from the ﬁrst quarter of 1994 to
the end of 1996 against the changes
implied by one-year-ahead inﬂation targets
of 2.5 percent, 3.0 percent and 3.5 percent.
The chart shows the change in the funds
rate that would aim to achieve the target
rate of inﬂation one year hence.  The
actual funds rate changes in Figure 2 indi-
cate that the seven increases in the target
funds rate from the ﬁrst quarter of 1994 to
the ﬁrst quarter of 1995 were consistent
with inﬂation targets near 2.5 percent, on
average.  Later in 1995, however, some
backsliding ensued, pushing the implicit
inﬂation target above 3.5 percent.  An
essentially constant funds rate after the ﬁrst
quarter of 1996 was roughly consistent with
a 3.0 percent inﬂation target, according to
the indicator rule.
Both the Taylor rule and the inﬂation-
targeting model concur that if the FOMC’s
inﬂation target was unambiguously below
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4 The inﬂation-targeting rule uses
a heteroscedastic time-varying
parameter model outlined in
Dueker and Fischer (1996) to
forecast the change in the
funds rate that is expected to
be consistent with the one-year-
ahead inﬂation target.
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3 percent, the funds rate ought to have
increased in the second half of 1996 (CPI
inﬂation for 1996 turned out to be 3.2 per-
cent). The FOMC, however, indicated at
the outset that it did not intend in 1996 to
push inﬂation decisively below its 3
percent trend: 
The [FOMC] members anticipated
that inﬂation would remain contained
in 1996, but they did not expect sig-
niﬁcant progress toward more stable
prices (Minutes, FOMC meeting,
January 30-31, 1996).
For the purposes of this article, we
deﬁne watchful waiting as a policy mode
in which policymakers (and probably
ﬁnancial markets) know the direction of
the next sustained series of policy moves,
but immediate action is not considered
necessary.  Policies ought to be categorized
as ‘neutral’ or ‘non-neutral’ relative to
some objective.  For this reason, a policy
of watchful waiting is not necessarily neu-
tral with respect to all ascribable policy
objectives.  Figures 1 and 2 suggest that
policy in 1996 was, on average, slightly
accommodative relative to an inﬂation
target between 2 percent and 3 percent. 
With this background, we examine
FOMC policy statements in light of a spate
of research results unveiled during 1996
that tended to bolster arguments against
an immediate policy push toward price
stability.   In particular, we look at the
policy implications of recent research on
duration dependence in economic expan-
sions, downward wage rigidities, time
variation in the natural rate of unemploy-
ment, bias in the consumer price index,
and the opportunistic approach to disinﬂa-
tion. We point to instances where current
research on these topics might have inﬂu-
enced the terms of monetary policy
discussions and thought in 1996.
DURATION DEPENDENCE IN
EXPANSIONS
By the middle of 1996, it was clear that
the U.S. economy was displaying a combina-
tion of continued robust growth, low unem-
ployment, and relatively stable inﬂation that
is rarely enjoyed by the sixth year of an eco-
nomic expansion.  Looking ahead, many
observers warned that all roads led
downhill, that economic conditions were
too good to last.  Yet the view that it was
‘time’ for the economy to come down from
its Olympic-year pinnacle did not reﬂect
current empirical evidence that economic
expansions do not invariably wither as they
age  (Kim and Nelson, 1995; Durland and
McCurdy, 1994; Diebold, Rudebusch, and
Sichel, 1993).  That is, the likelihood that an
economic expansion will give way to a
recession does not appear to increase
systematically with the age of the expansion.
This lack of duration dependence in
economic expansions does not mean that
the business cycle can be repealed; instead,
it implies that each recession arises from
idiosyncratic shocks and particular
structural imbalances in the economy, rather
than from an expansion that simply ‘runs
out of steam.’  As Tolstoy said, “All unhappy
families are unique in their unhappiness.”
Recent economic research suggests that
although recessions, like the existence of
unhappy families, may be inevitable, they all
have unique origins.
FOMC policymakers appear to agree
with the conclusions from academic
research that do not ﬁnd duration depen-
dence in expansions, as Chairman of the
Board of Governors Alan Greenspan indi-
cated in Congressional testimony on
February 26, 1997:
There is no evidence, however, that
the business cycle has been repealed.
Another recession will doubtless
occur some day owing to circum-
stances that could not be, or at least
were not, perceived by policymakers
and ﬁnancial participants alike.
This statement makes clear that reces-
sions do not occur simply because too
much time has passed since the last one.
Chairman Greenspan explicitly echoed
such thinking in Congressional testimony
on February 20, 1996: FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
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Economic expansions, however, do
not necessarily die of old age. Al-
though the factors governing each
individual business cycle are not
always clear, expansions usually end
because serious imbalances eventually
develop.
By implication, recessions are the
product of particular imbalances and
shocks that, if recognized and understood
at the time, could have been countered by
market participants and policymakers.
Business cycle analysts have long recognized
that overly optimistic sales projections can
induce overproduction and a resulting
inventory overhang that can lead to business
recessions. In his February 20, 1996, Con-
gressional testimony, Chairman Greenspan
noted that “asset overhang” is another
potential imbalance that threatens healthy
economic growth:
Capital expenditures by households
and ﬁrms can contribute signiﬁcantly
to the development of cycle-ending
imbalances.  The levels of stocks of
such real assets have effects on output
very similar to those of business
inventories. . . . The dynamics of
expanding output and rising proﬁt
expectations often create a degree of
exuberance, which, as in much of
human nature, tends on occasion to
excess— in this case, in the form of a
temporary overaccumulation of
assets.  The ensuing correction in
demand for such assets can signiﬁ-
cantly mute growth for a time or even
cause a downturn if the imbalances
are large enough.
It is interesting to note that this
statement clearly presages Chairman
Greenspan’s widely-publicized utterances
on December 5, 1996, about the potential
for “irrational exuberance” in the stock
market. The danger articulated by Chairman
Greenspan is that investors, emboldened
by high current proﬁts and incomes, will
allocate resources to marginal investment
projects and capital goods that may not
yield satisfactory returns in the future.  To
hedge against the risk of low future returns
and help insure their future consumption
possibilities, investors in speculative pro-
jects ought to insist upon commensurate
risk premiums.  One concern Chairman
Greenspan expressed in Congressional tes-
timony, however, is that “risk premiums
for advancing funds to businesses in virtu-
ally all ﬁnancial markets have declined to
near-record lows” (1997 Monetary Policy
Objectives, p. 8).   Disappointing outcomes
from speculative investments threaten to
reduce people’s future purchasing power and
the level of economic activity in general. An
example from the 1980s is the extreme over-
investment in commercial real estate—“strip
malls”—that depressed the market and took
years to unwind.  
Monetary policymakers suggest that
many economic imbalances that can lead
to recessions are less likely to develop if
inﬂation is controlled: 
The FOMC has recognized the
need to remain vigilant for signs of
potentially inﬂationary imbalances
that might, if not corrected prompt-
ly, undermine our economic expan-
sion. . . . The FOMC has to be
sensitive to indications of even slow-
ly building imbalances, whatever
their source, that, by fostering the
emergence of inﬂation pressures,
would ultimately threaten healthy
economic expansion. (Monetary
Policy Testimony and Report to
Congress,  February 26, 1997.)
To foster sustainable economic
growth, one overriding imperative for
monetary policymakers in this expansion
has been to avoid what one economic jour-
nalist describes as
. . . the giant error the Japanese
economy made during the “bubble
years” of the 1980s.  Then, powered
by extraordinarily cheap capital,
Japanese companies in a range of
industries rushed into deals founded
on no real business logic. [TheseFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
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deals] were probably doomed from
the outset, and it is not surprising
they have come painfully unstuck.5
The weak performance of the Japanese
economy in the 1990s attests to the cost of
undoing severe economic imbalances. The
U.S. economy, to a lesser extent than
Japan, experienced excessive speculation
in the middle to late 1980s.  An associated
uptick in inﬂation helped derail the economic
expansion that lasted from 1982 to 1990.
Now Federal Reserve policymakers appear
determined to prevent the emergence of
cycle-ending inﬂationary imbalances in the
late 1990s.
In its overall thrust, the current state of
knowledge concerning the lack of duration
dependence in economic expansions
provides monetary policymakers with a
strong impetus to conduct preemptive
strikes aimed at preventing inﬂationary
imbalances in the economy.  It does less,
however, to supply a rationale for further
disinﬂation in the near term. 
DOWNWARD WAGE
RIGIDITIES
Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry (1996)
presented a well-publicized article, “The
Macroeconomics of Low Inﬂation,” at a
conference in March 1996 and garnered a
great deal of attention as a voice of caution
against a headlong move toward monetary
policies aimed at zero inﬂation. The authors’
main claim is that the natural rate of
unemployment varies with the inﬂation
rate in a way that makes inﬂation rates
below 3 percent particularly deleterious for
the economy. For example, simulations of
the Akerlof/Dickens/Perry model suggest
that when the economy moves from
having a steady-state inﬂation rate of 6
percent to a 3 percent rate, the natural rate
of unemployment increases from 5.8 per-
cent to 5.9 percent, but if inflation
decreases from 3 percent to zero percent,
the natural rate of unemployment rises
from 5.9 percent to 7.6 percent.  Such a
provocative claim has obliged policymakers
to examine the assumptions behind the
study by Akerlof et al. and evaluate the
plausibility of their ﬁndings.  
The chief assumption in the Akerlof/
Dickens/Perry model, with accompanying
evidence from survey data, is that nominal
wages are downwardly rigid out of a sense
of  “fairness” between workers and
employers, except in cases where workers
believe the ﬁrm’s survival is at stake.  In
this model, a subset of ﬁrms in the
economy during each period suffers an
adverse change in the relative price of the
goods the ﬁrms produce, and they can
only maintain employment at previous
levels by reducing labor costs. At low, but
positive, inﬂation rates, real wages can
adjust downward among adversely affected
ﬁrms as needed to maintain employment
without nominal wage cuts.  At zero inﬂa-
tion, however, such downward adjustments
cannot occur in adversely affected ﬁrms
because of opposition to nominal wage
cuts. Therefore, the natural rate of unem-
ployment rises as inﬂation falls enough to
prevent declines in real wages.  In this way,
the Akerlof /Dickens/Perry model illustrates
Tobin’s (1972) idea that a little inﬂation
“greases the wheels of the labor market.” 
Other economists, however, question
the extent to which nominal wages would
be as downwardly rigid in a world of
stable prices, as opposed to the moderate
inflation that held throughout the period
covering the collection of the survey data
used in the Akerlof/Dickens/Perry study.
Gordon (1996b) argues that nominal
wage cuts rightly seem unfair to workers
in view of the fact that nominal compen-
sation per hour has increased by more
than 100 percent in two of the past three
decades.  If prices were stable and nominal
compensation were to increase at the
same rate as productivity over long time
spans, then brief periods of nominal wage
cuts in adversely affected industries
would likely become more prevalent by
mutual agreement between workers and
ﬁrms. Furthermore, Akerlof et al. assume
that wages are the only margin at which
firms can adjust worker compensation.
However, because most workers view
benefits as more tenuous parts of their
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24, 1996, and December 17,
1996, and the February  20,
1996, Monetary Policy Report
to Congress.
7 See the Minutes of the May
21, 1996 FOMC meeting.
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implicit contract with employers, they
would probably find increases in
employee-paid health insurance premiums
and deductibles less objectionable than
wage cuts. 
Mankiw (1996) ﬁnds fault with
the extent to which today’s wage rate
determines labor demand and supply in
the Akerlof/Dickens/Perry model.  He notes
that in most cases employees and employers
have long-term relationships in which they
view today’s wage as an installment payment
on a long stream of work performed, rather
than as an allocative price determining how
many people will be employed this period.    
In its July 1996 meeting, the FOMC
appears to have alluded to the study by
Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry in a discussion
of the long-run inﬂation objective.  Perhaps
in response to this and other research on
nominal wage rigidities, the FOMC has
decided to monitor the economy carefully
for signs of rigidities in labor markets as
the inﬂation rate falls further:
Some [members] also observed that
the precise level of average price inﬂa-
tion that might be compatible with
the optimal functioning of the econo-
my was an unsettled issue owing, for
example, to potential rigidities in
labor markets. Thus far, such rigidi-
ties had not impeded the economy
from functioning at a very high level
as inﬂation came down, and contin-
ued adaptation to even lower inﬂation
rates was very likely.  However, the
Committee would need to pay careful
attention to these potential problems
as inﬂation fell further.  For now, the
members agreed that some additional
progress in reducing inﬂation was
very likely to improve the ultimate
performance of the economy, and that
it was particularly important at this
juncture to resist ﬁrmly any tendency
for inﬂation to worsen. (Minutes,
FOMC meeting, July 2-3, 1996.)
With this discussion, the FOMC indi-
cated that studies such as the one by
Akerlof, Dickens and Perry had not
dissuaded it from pursuing price stability
as its long-run objective.  The Committee
agreed, however, to monitor the labor
market closely for signs of rigidities as
inﬂation fell further.
TIME-VARYING NAIRU
On repeated occasions in 1996,
the FOMC referred to the fact that the
increase in wage inﬂation has been signiﬁ-
cantly less than most observers would
have expected on the basis of historical
relationships.6 The question in 1996 was,
Why is wage inﬂation not higher, given an
unemployment rate well below 6 percent?
This level of unemployment had been a
consensus estimate of the non-accelerating-
inﬂation rate of unemployment (NAIRU).
Mentioned at every FOMC meeting in
1996, worker “insecurity about the perma-
nence of jobs or the availability of alternative
jobs” provides an explanation for how the
unemployment could temporarily dip below
the NAIRU without triggering increased
wage inﬂation.7 Similarly, the FOMC
noted that a structural shift towards man-
aged health care was achieving reductions
in the growth of beneﬁts costs,  which
could prove to be either temporary or
long-lasting:
Firms have been making
unprecedented efforts to gain bet-
ter control over the rate of rise in
the cost of beneﬁts provided to
employees, especially those related
to health care.  Although some of
these efforts may have only a one-
time effect on the level of benefit
costs, groundwork also seems to
have been laid for slower growth of
benefits over time.  (Monetary
Policy Report to Congress,
February 20, 1996.)
In the event that the fortuitous
circumstances on the inﬂation front were
only temporary,
Some members noted that the
Committee would need to anticipate,FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
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and act to preclude, a rise in the core
rate of inﬂation. . . . .  In this regard,
the view was expressed that a ﬁrming
in policy sooner rather than later was
likely to end up promoting stability in
output and prices. (Minutes,  FOMC
meeting, May 21, 1996.)
Proponents of a wait-and-see approach,
on the other hand, argued that the NAIRU
might have decreased substantially from 6
percent, and the Fed ought to give the
economy the opportunity to settle at a
lower long-run rate of unemployment.
Academic support for this view came from
empirical studies by Ball (1996) and
Gordon (1996a) showing estimates of a
decrease in the NAIRU in the United
States.  For those who would use Phillips-
curve analysis to guide monetary policy,
the time-varying NAIRU model by Gordon
(1996) makes two contributions to the
conduct of monetary policy in 1996.
First, it quantiﬁes in a systematic way the
intuitive feeling that the NAIRU must have
fallen in the 1990s, because inﬂation in
1996 did not accelerate as it did in 1988-
90.  The time-varying estimates by Gordon
(1996a) lie close to the historical
benchmark of 6 percent over the period
between 1955 and 1996, ranging between
5.3 percent and 6.5  percent.  Gordon’s
results also highlight the differences
between NAIRU estimates stemming from
alternative measures of inﬂation.  This sen-
sitivity could be viewed as either a
weakness of NAIRU estimates or a clarion
call for the Fed to take a stand as to which
inﬂation concept it is trying to stabilize.
Gordon’s estimates show that in recent
years there has been a downward shift in
the NAIRU from around 6.2 percent in the
late 1980s to approximately 5.7 percent,
according to the GDP deﬂator, and 5.2 per-
cent, according to the PCE deﬂator.     
The lack of precision in NAIRU
estimates is an issue raised by Staiger,
Stock, and Watson (1996).  They suggest
that the uncertainty surrounding any esti-
mate of NAIRU is so broad as to render the
concept useless for conducting policy.
Gordon (1996a) proposes an economic
criterion based on smoothness, rather than
a statistical criterion, as a basis for
choosing among alternative NAIRU
estimates.  Nevertheless, the ability to
choose among NAIRU estimates does not
guarantee that the chosen estimate will
perform well as an inﬂation indicator in
the future.           
In sum, discussion throughout 1996 of
a possible decrease in the NAIRU would
have added ambiguity to any FOMC move
to ﬁrm monetary policy.  Observers would
have asked, Is the FOMC tightening
because it does not believe that the NAIRU
has fallen, or because it believes the long-
term health of the economy would beneﬁt
from a policy ﬁrming, even at a lower
NAIRU?  In such circumstances, it is not
surprising that the FOMC chose to wait
until it could send an unambiguous signal
of its intentions.  On the other hand, the
FOMC could have taken evidence of unpre-
dictable movements in the NAIRU to imply
that unemployment-based models of inﬂa-
tion are not reliable guides for monetary
policy:  How can policymakers base their
predictions of changes in inﬂation on an
employment gap if no one can determine
whether the gap is positive or negative?
BIASES IN THE CPI  
Another issue in the debate over
U.S. inﬂation centered on whether the
consumer price index (CPI) provides a
reliable measure of inﬂation relative to
either an ideal cost-of-living index or cur-
rently available alternative measures. In
fact, similar debates regarding the
measurement of inﬂation are taking place
in other major countries—especially those
that have adopted quantitative inﬂation
targets—as nearly all OECD countries
move closer to price stability.8 Table 1
shows that the CPI measure of inﬂation
exceeded other measures in 1995 and even
more so in 1996.  In addition, Table 1
illustrates that it was not clear whether
inflation was increasing or decreasing in
1996; the interpretation depended on
which measure was used.  Consequently,
the CPI faced increased scrutiny,
8 By 1996, the U.S. inﬂation rate
of 3.2 percent exceeded the
OECD average of 2.4 percent
(excluding Mexico and Turkey).FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
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especially in its role as the basis for
annual adjustments in entitlements such
as Social Security benefits.
Because of the ubiquity of the CPI in
the public’s perceptions of inflation, most
politicians and economists agreed that the
priority ought to be on improving the
CPI, not replacing it. Towards this end,
the Senate Finance Committee asked a
panel headed by Michael Boskin to inves-
tigate the biases in the CPI and recommend
changes (Boskin Commission Report to
the Senate Finance Committee,  1996).
The Boskin Commission considered sev-
eral sources of bias in the CPI as a measure
of the cost of living and estimated that the
total overstatement of inﬂation amounted
to 1.1 percentage points per year. The
range of plausible values for the bias was
pegged at 0.8 to 1.6 percentage points. 
The panel attributed the measurement
error to three main sources: understatement
of quality improvements, 0.6 percentage
points; substitution bias (the tendency of
consumers to change spending patterns as
relative prices move), 0.4 percentage points;
and switching among retailers (the
increasing tendency to buy the same good
at a lower price from discount outlets), 0.1
percentage point. These three biases were
summed linearly, yielding the 1.1 percent
estimate of the total measurement bias. As
Wynne and Sigalla (1994) note, however, it
is likely that substitution and quality biases
overlap, resulting in a smaller overall bias,
although there has been insufﬁcient empir-
ical work on the problem of measurement
error in the price indexes. 
A controversial conclusion in the
Boskin report is that the CPI has persis-
tently and substantially overstated inﬂation
for several decades.  This claim implies that
the underlying performance of the U.S.
economy over the 20 years between 1976
and 1996 was far better than previously esti-
mated. If the price element of the overall
increase in national income, wages, and
other components was actually lower than
previously  thought, the real elements must
have been higher.  Because the panel
believes the bias to be persistent, it proposes
cutting the government deﬁcit by lowering
the rate of increase in public pensions to a
rate below current CPI inﬂation and slowing
the indexation of tax brackets.  These steps
would cut spending and raise tax revenues. 
The FOMC did not comment on the
Boskin report directly, but the Humphrey-
Hawkins Report in February 1997
included two important observations.
First, as noted in the July 1996 monetary
policy report, Chairman Greenspan recog-
nized BLS efforts in undertaking recent
technical improvements in the CPI.  Such
changes have reduced the reported rate of
CPI inﬂation slightly in the last two years.
Second, because it is difﬁcult to measure
inﬂation in an evolving economy, a variety
of price indexes will be weighed in moni-
toring price developments.9
In general, uncertainty regarding the
accuracy of inﬂation measures is likely to
make the FOMC somewhat more hesitant
to embark on a disinﬂationary drive
toward price stability until it can be estab-
lished just how far the economy is from
price stability at the outset.  
OPPORTUNISTIC
DISINFLATION
Federal Reserve Governor Laurence
Meyer coined the term “opportunistic dis-
inﬂation” to describe a monetary policy
JULY/AUGUST 1997
9 Monetary Policy Report to
Congress, July 1996.





Consumer Price Index 2.7 3.2
CPI ex food and energy 3.0 2.6
Chain Type
Personal Consumption Expenditures 2.1 2.5
PCE ex food and energy 2.3 2.0
Gross domestic purchases 2.3 2.2
Gross domestic product 2.5 2.1
Implicit Deﬂator
Gross domestic product 2.5 1.8
SOURCE: Monetary Policy Report to Congress, February 26, 1997.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
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approach he observed before joining the
Fed.10 This strategy is implemented when
an economy is expanding and inﬂation is
at a modest level that could be tolerated
for several years or more.  In this context,
the opportunistic approach would have the
FOMC concentrate on sustaining the
expansion near the trend rate of output
growth, provided that inﬂation remained
“close” (with limited wiggle room) to a
baseline level that prevailed at the
beginning of the current economic expan-
sion.  This baseline rate of inﬂation serves
as an important reference point in the
opportunistic approach.  If inﬂation were
to show signs of creeping uncomfortably
above the baseline rate, monetary
policymakers would switch their focus
from shepherding real growth to controlling
inﬂation. Assuming that inﬂation is kept
near the baseline rate throughout the entire
economic expansion, no overt policy steps
toward disinﬂation would be taken.  In
order to progress toward price stability over
time, Meyer explains,
[The opportunistic approach] takes
advantage of the opportunity of
inevitable recessions and potential pos-
itive supply shocks to ratchet down
inﬂation over time.  Proponents of this
strategy sometimes describe this
approach as reducing inﬂation cycle to
cycle or describe the economy as being
one recession from price stability.11
To critics, the opportunistic approach
lets policymakers claim they have a strategy
for achieving price stability, while it allows
them never to be seen actively pushing
the inflation rate downward.  According
to the opportunistic approach, monetary
policy would spend most of the time
maintaining the status quo.  Activist
policy steps would be taken only to help
the economy recover from recessions.  In
this way, policymakers could avoid
activist disinflationary policy steps that
might be unpopular in the short run.
Proponents of the opportunistic approach,
in contrast, view it as a patient course of
action that is likely to minimize any cost
of achieving price stability in the long
run.  As Governor Meyer says, 
[The opportunistic approach] links
short-run policy actions to long-run
objectives, juggles multiple targets in
a disciplined way, and would be suc-
cessful in achieving the long-run
[price-stability] objective over time.12
In a self-described exercise in reverse
engineering, Orphanides and Wilcox
(1996) investigate the sort of policymaker
preferences that might lead to adoption of
the opportunistic approach to disinﬂation.
While they succeed in identifying a policy-
maker’s loss function that implies the
opportunistic approach, the preferences
they describe appear to be ad hoc on theo-
retical grounds.13 In addition, policymakers
are assumed to face a Phillips-curve inﬂa-
tion process in which clear announcements
to the public and credible policies are
assumed not to inﬂuence the costs of disinﬂa-
tion. Thus, political economy considerations,
not economic theory, stand as the strongest
rationale for the opportunistic approach.
Whatever the basis, however, the oppor-
tunistic approach to disinflation could be
viewed as an argument against taking
immediate policy steps in 1996 to bring




In this section, we summarize the FOMC
directive to the open-market desk at the New
York Fed following each of the eight FOMC
meetings in 1996, and we compare the direc-
tives to prevailing market expectations prior
to the meetings.  First, however, we examine
the central tendency projections of FOMC
members for the near-term economic
landscape in terms of nominal GDP growth,
real GDP growth, CPI inﬂation, and the
unemployment rate.14
Table 2 shows that FOMC members,
like many professional forecasters, under-
estimated the real growth prospects for the
10 Laurence Meyer, BIS Review
(19 September, 1996), p. 7.
11 BIS Review, 19 September,
1996, p. 7.
12 BIS Review, 19 September,
1996, p.7.
13 Both the squared deviation and
the absolute deviation between
actual and potential output
appear in the loss function, but
only the squared deviation from
the baseline inﬂation rate is
included.  Moreover, the model
speciﬁes only the short-run pref-
erences of policymakers; the
connection between these
short-run preferences and the
presumed long-run objective of
price stability is not elaborated. 
14 In presenting similar projec-
tions, the Deutsche
Bundesbank carefully distin-
guishes its short-run forecasts
from its long-run policy objec-
tives by calling projected inﬂa-
tion “unavoidable” near-term
inﬂation.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
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economy in 1996, even through the July
1996 meeting.  In hindsight, the February
1996 projection for real output growth was
too pessimistic, but severe winter weather
at the time that made it unusually difﬁcult
to distinguish between cyclical and
seasonal slowdowns in output. In all three
projections, the FOMC members overesti-
mated the rate of unemployment that
would hold in the fourth quarter of 1996.
With this summary of the economy’s
performance in 1996 and policymakers’
expectations of it, we now turn to the
policy directives issued at each of the
FOMC meetings in 1996. 
Under current operating procedures, the
FOMC issues a directive to the Open Market
Desk at the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York immediately after each meeting, in
which it speciﬁes whether and by how
much to change the degree of restraint
placed on the market for bank reserves.
Since February 1994, the FOMC has pub-
licly announced changes on the day they are
made.  At each meeting, the Committee also
decides how open it is to possible inter-
meeting moves toward increasing and
decreasing the degree of reserves restraint.
These decisions about potential actions are
not made public immediately, however.
They are included in the minutes of the
meeting, which are released after the next
meeting.  Regarding intermeeting policy
actions, the FOMC indicates that it either
“would” or “might” be willing to consider a
move in a given direction. With either
choice, an intermeeting move is possible,
but “might” indicates that a move in that
direction is deemed less likely.  In a neutral
directive, the FOMC indicates that it
“would” be willing to consider intermeeting
moves in either direction.  In an asymmetric
directive, the Committee “would” be willing
to consider an intermeeting move in one
direction, but only “might” consider a move
in the opposite direction. Table 3 summarizes
the FOMC directives following its 1996
meetings.  Only the January meeting
resulted in a policy change, which led to
less restraint in the reserves market and a
25-basis-point decrease in the target funds
rate.  Several meetings in the second half
of the year, however, ended with asym-
metric directives with a bias towards
increasing the degree of pressure on the
reserves market.  These directives did not
result in any intermeeting policy changes.
Thus, the FOMC appeared to use asymmetric
directives to put its inﬂation concerns on
record and signal to ﬁnancial markets (with a
disclosure lag of about six weeks, on average)
that it was remaining alert and vigilant on the
inﬂation front, rather than to signal imminent
intermeeting moves. 
Because the FOMC was prepared to
increase the degree of restraint on the
Table 2
1996 and 1997 Economic Forecasts from FOMC Central
Tendency Projections
Variable July 1995 February 1996 July 1996 Actual
Projections Nominal GDP  4 
3/4 to 5 1/2 4 1/4 to 4 3/4 5 to 5 1/2 5.0
for 1996 Real GDP 2 1/4 to 2 3/4 2to 2 1/4 21/2 to 2 3/4 3.1
CPI 2 7/8 to 3 1/4 2 3/4 to 3 3 to 3 1/4 3.2
Unemp. rate 5 3/4 to 6 1/8 5 1/2 to 5 3/4 About 5 1/2 5.3
Projections Nominal GDP  4 
1/4 to 5 
for 1997 Real GDP 1 3/4 to 2 1/4
CPI 2 3/4 to 3
Unemp. rate 5 1/2 to 5 3/4
SOURCE FOR PROJECTIONS: Monetary Policy Reports to Congress.  Unemployment rate is the fourth-quarter average.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
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reserves market following the last five
meetings of the year, the Committee
described its own posture as “watchful
waiting” (Minutes, FOMC meeting,
December 17, 1996).  The minutes from
several meetings indicate that the FOMC
believed that inflation was more likely to
increase than decrease: 
• The risks continue to be tilted to 
some extent in the direction of rising 
price inﬂation (Minutes, FOMC 
meeting, September 24, 1996).
• Continued pressure on resources, 
especially in labor markets, pointed to 
a likely underlying tendency toward 
higher inﬂation over the projection 
period (Minutes, FOMC meeting, 
November 13, 1996).
• The members agreed that the risks of ris-
ing inﬂation could not be dismissed and 
several continued to view slightly higher 
inﬂation as a likely if not inevitable 
prospect (Minutes, FOMC meeting, 
November 13, 1996).
Table 3
FOMC Policy Directives From 1996 Meetings
Date of meeting Policy Change at Meeting  Intermeeting Stance Dissenting Votes
Jan. 30-31 Decreased Restraint Neutral None
Mar. 26 None Neutral None
May 21 None Neutral None
July 2-3 None Asymmeric (+) Stern
Aug. 20 None Asymmeric (+) Stern
Sept. 24 None Asymmeric (+) Stern
Nov. 13 None Asymmeric (+) None
Dec. 17 None Asymmeric (+) None
Target Fed Funds Target Fed Funds Discount Rate Discount Rate
Rate Before Meeting  Rate After Meeting Before Meeting After Meeting
Jan. 30-31 5.50 5.25 5.25 5.00
Mar. 26 5.25 5.25 5.00 5.00
May 21 5.25 5.25 5.00 5.00
July 2-3 5.25 5.25 5.00 5.00
Aug. 20 5.25 5.25 5.00 5.00
Sept. 24 5.25 5.25 5.00 5.00
Nov. 13 5.25 5.25 5.00 5.00
Dec. 17 5.25 5.25 5.00 5.00
NOTE:  (+) indicates a bias towards greater restraint• Members observed that the risks on 
inﬂation still seemed to be tilted 
toward some rise over time (Minutes, 
FOMC meeting, December 17, 1996).
Yet, as of the August 20 meeting, the
Committee felt there was still time for
future policy steps that would come in
“anticipation of greater price pressures
and before they showed through to actual
inflation” (Minutes, FOMC meeting,
August 20, 1996).
In each of his three dissents,
President Stern disapproved of the
decision not to adopt a more restrictive
policy.  He was concerned not only about
the current risk of higher inflation, but
also about making immediate progress
toward lowering inflation: 
In [Mr. Stern’s] view, the momen-
tum of the economy and strains on
capacity in labor and some other
markets raised the possibility of an
acceleration of inflation that would
jeopardize the economic expansion.
This concern aside, Mr. Stern also
believed that current circumstances
were favorable for policy action to
reduce inflation further. (Minutes,
FOMC meeting, July 2-3, 1996.)
These policy decisions can be compared
with market expectations of the future course
of the federal funds rate just prior to FOMC
meetings.  Figure 3 illustrates the whipsaw
movement of market expectations in 1996.
Prior to the January meeting, the fed funds
futures market exhibited fears that the expan-
sion was losing momentum, and it predicted
a sequence of rate cuts.  At the time of the
May meeting, fears of an economic downturn
had subsided, and the funds rate was
projected to remain relatively steady.
Between the July and September meetings,
however, an inﬂation scare led market partici-
pants to predict a total increase in the funds
rate of about 50 basis points by early 1997.
By the time of the November and December
meetings, the risk of a sudden rise in inﬂation
had diminished, and market expectations for
the future path of the funds rate again
ﬂattened. Some observers claim that policy
must be about right if markets are not certain
whether the next appropriate change in the
funds rate will be up or down.  Others
argue that whipsaw movements in market
expectations indicate that markets believe
that Federal Reserve policy decisions rely
too heavily on short-run developments in
the economy. 
Market interest rates and term spreads
reﬂect longer-term expectations of mone-
tary policies.  Figure 4 shows the term
spreads on government securities of
selected maturities throughout 1995 and
1996.  Long-term bond rates increased by
about 50 basis points from the beginning
to the end of 1996.  Part of the increase
can be attributed to increased conﬁdence
in the strength of the current expansion,
and part may reﬂect ﬁrming inﬂation
expectations.  Of course, such a decompo-
sition of long-term interest rates is
notoriously difﬁcult, and it is hoped that
the Treasury’s new indexed bonds,
introduced in January 1997, can help
monetary policymakers discern changes in
long-run inﬂation expectations as bond
rates change.
The increase in medium- and long-term
interest rates in 1996 led some observers to
claim that the bond market had already
tightened credit, thereby making Fed action
JULY/AUGUST 1997
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Figure 3less necessary.  The Fed’s July 1996 report to
Congress cites the inﬂuence of the bond
market in such a vein:
Looking forward, there are a num-
ber of reasons to expect demands to
moderate and economic activity to
settle back to a more sustainable
pace in the months ahead.  First, the
bond markets have taken a turn
toward restraint this year as they
have responded to incoming data
depicting an economy that was
stronger than had been anticipated.
Intermediate and longer-term inter-
est rates have risen from 1 to 1-1/4
percentage points since January.
(Monetary Policy Testimony and
Report to Congress, July 1996.)
Any ‘tightening’ in credit markets
was, moreover, partially reversed by
declines in long-term rates between
August and December 1996.
Goodfriend (1993) provides one way
to view the notion of a bond market-
driven tightening.  He defines an
inflation scare as a “significant long-rate
rise in the absence of an aggressive funds
rate tightening” (p. 8).  By this deﬁnition,
the economy experienced something
close to a minor inflation scare in the
second quarter of 1996.  Hence even if
the bond market can tighten credit con-
ditions without the assistance of Fed
policy actions, this manner of reining in
credit demand imposes inflation risk on
both lenders and borrowers.  Worse yet,
the Fed’s
. . . failing to respond promptly
can create a crisis of conﬁdence that
encourages the higher inﬂation to
materialize: workers and ﬁrms ask
for wage and price increases to pro-
tect themselves from higher expect-
ed costs (Goodfriend, 1993, p. 8).
In an inﬂation scare, the resulting
increases in borrowing costs can act as an
inﬂationary imbalance well before any
increase in inﬂation. For this reason, it is
preferable for the Fed to use pre-emptive
policy actions as a means of ensuring that
increases in market interest rates arise
primarily from increases in expected real
returns, rather than from increased inﬂation
risk premiums.  Even though markets deter-
mine interest rates, the Fed has a lot to do
with shaping the concerns of bondholders,
especially their inﬂation fears.
CONCLUSIONS
The FOMC explicitly de-emphasized
monetary targets as the anchor for monetary
policy in July 1993.  Gavin (1996) reviews
tentative discussions by the FOMC about
adopting inﬂation targets as the new  anchor.
In our opinion, the current period without an
JULY/AUGUST 1997
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explicit policy anchor may go down in U.S.
monetary history as an “interregnum.”  Thus,
in 1996 the FOMC adopted a stance of
watchful waiting, not only in terms of waiting
for signs of emerging inﬂationary imbalances
in the current economic expansion, but also
in waiting to embrace a new anchor for mon-
etary policy.  The prospect of policymakers
settling on a new policy anchor that they can
unanimously deem reliable is not likely in the
near term.  Yet, the U.S. economy might not
achieve price stability until the Fed has a new
policy anchor.  As witnessed in 1996, there
are many citable reasons, including those
recently suggested by  academic researchers,
for questioning whether any given moment is
the appropriate time to move from 3 percent
inﬂation toward price stability.  We believe
that a new policy anchor could help ensure
that such ancillary concerns do not  indeﬁ-
nitely postpone achievement of price stability.  
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VOTING MEMBERS OF THE FOMC IN 1996
The Federal Open Market Committee, the monetary policymaking body of the
Federal Reserve, consists of the seven members of the Board of Governors and the
twelve Reserve Bank presidents.  The seven governors and the President of the New
York Fed are permanent voting members.  In addition, four of the other eleven Reserve
Bank presidents vote on an annual, rotating basis.  Reserve Bank presidents who are
not voting members in a particular year continue to attend the meetings and participate
in policy discussions. Members of the FOMC in 1996 are listed below:*
Alan Greenspan
Chair, Board of Governors and FOMC
William J. McDonough
President, Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Vice Chair of the FOMC
Alice Rivlin
Vice Chair, Board of Governors (starting July 1996)
Edward G. Boehne
President, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
Jerry L. Jordan
President, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
Edward W. Kelley, Jr.
Member, Board of Governors
Lawrence B. Lindsey
Member, Board of Governors
Robert D. McTeer, Jr.
President, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
Laurence H. Meyer
Member, Board of Governors (starting May 1996)
Susan M. Phillips
Member, Board of Governors
Gary H. Stern
President, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
Janet L. Yellen
Member, Board of Governors
* The Board of Governors entered the ﬁrst meeting with two vacant 
positions, which were not ﬁlled prior to the third and fourth
meetings, respectively.THE M2 TARGET RANGE
Twice a year in monetary policy
reports, the FOMC is required to inform
Congress of the target ranges that it sets
for the growth of monetary aggregates.
For most of the decade prior to July 1993,
the M2 aggregate, which includes currency
in circulation, transactions account deposits,
savings deposits, and money-market account
balances, attracted considerable attention,
because the FOMC on occasion cited M2’s
position in relation to its target cone as the
impetus behind policy changes. Since that
time, the FOMC has explicitly de-empha-
sized M2 as a policy indicator; however, as
required by law, it has continued to report
target ranges for M2 growth.  In its January
1996 meeting, the FOMC adopted the
same target growth range for 1996 that
had been in force in 1995: 1 percent to 5
percent.  This range was ratiﬁed at the July
1996 meeting and was provisionally set for
1997.  Figure A-1 shows that actual M2
growth for 1996 came in slightly under the
top of the cone that corresponds with a 5
percent growth rate. 
In the January 1996 meeting, Gover-
nors Lindsey and Yellen dissented in the
vote to establish this target range.  They
foresaw somewhat higher growth rates in
M2 under appropriate monetary policy
and wanted the target range to reflect
those expectations.  The majority,
however, felt that 
. . . [the existing] ranges could be
viewed as benchmarks for money
growth that would be associated with
price stability, assuming behavior of
velocity in line with historical experi-
ence, and a reafﬁrmation of those ranges
would underscore the Committee’s
commitment to a policy of achieving
price stability over the longer term
(Minutes, FOMC meeting January
30-31, 1996).
Time did not resolve this difference in
opinion, as the same members dissented
in the July meeting on the same grounds.
The 1 percent to 5 percent growth
range for M2 (with a 3 percent midpoint)
would be considered a signal of the Com-
mittee’s intention to achieve price
stability because, from 1955 to 1989, M2
velocity neither increased nor decreased,
on average.  Thus 3 percent growth in M2
would imply 3 percent long-run growth
in nominal GDP , which is close to the
long-run growth rate of real output and
would be consistent with relatively stable
prices.  The July 1996 Monetary Policy
Report to Congress notes that, although
M2 velocity increased on average in 1991
and 1992 by more than historical
relationships between M2, its opportunity
cost, and nominal income would have
implied, M2 and nominal GDP have
grown more in parallel since then.  Never-
theless, “it is impossible to know whether
the new parallel movement of velocity and
the opportunity cost [of M2] will
continue.”1
Table A-1 indicates how the growth
rates of the M2 and M3 aggregates fared
relative to their respective targets in 1996.
For domestic nonﬁnancial debt, the
FOMC establishes a monitoring range,
rather than a formal target.  M2 and
domestic nonﬁnancial debt grew at rates
that put them into the upper ends of their
respective ranges, and M3 grew faster than
suggested by the target range. 
SWEEP ACCOUNTS
In the Monetary Policy Report to Con-
gress in July 1996 and in February 1997,
Chairman Greenspan commented on the
growing use of retail sweep accounts by
banks to avoid reserve requirements.
Banks use sweep programs to shift funds
from transaction accounts, which require
reserves, to money-market deposit
accounts (MMDAs) that do not.  Banks
have an incentive to economize on
reserves holdings that do not earn interest.
The proliferation of retail sweep accounts
has reduced reported reserves, the
monetary base, and M1.  Although it is not
1 Monetary Policy Report to
Congress, July 1996.
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Appendixpossible to attribute particular increases in
MMDAs to sweeps programs, the approxi-
mate divergence in 1995-96 between the
growth rates of M1 and M1 plus sweep
accounts is depicted in Figure A-2.
The Fed has monitored the growth of
sweep accounts in recent years because of
the role reserves play in the central bank’s
exercise of monetary policy. The continued
growth of sweep programs could reduce the
predictability of overall reserve demand and
thus adversely affect the Federal Reserve’s
ability to gauge the supply of reserves in
relation to its intended monetary policy
stance. Moreover, there is a concern that a
precipitous drop in reserves could create
excessive volatility in the market for
overnight funds, hampering the Fed’s
ability to conduct monetary policy. If the
Fed wants to slow or halt the use of sweep
accounts, it could consider several options.
One strategy is to impose reserve require-
ments on money market accounts.  An
alternative is for the Fed to ask for
congressional approval to pay banks
interest on reserves. 
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FOMC Monitoring Ranges for Growth of Money
and Nonﬁnancial Debt in 1996
Table A-1
Aggregate  July 1995 Feb. 1996  July 1996  Actual
M2 1-5 1-5 1-5 4.6
M3 2-6 2-6 2-6 6.7
Non-ﬁnancial 3-7 3-7 3-7 5.4
debt
SOURCE: Monetary Policy Objectives: Summary Reports of the Federal Reserve Board.  
Growth rates are for the period 1995Q4-1996Q4.
Date at which target was set
1995 1996
M2 with Target Range
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Figure A-1